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TIIE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL BANK lN
THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY.
DR. Paul A. OGWUMA, OFR
GOVERNOR
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA

I am pleased to have the privilege, l)nce again, of aJdrcssing this august assembly
on the occasion of the lnstitute·s Annual Dinncr. It is also con\'\:nient for me to be
allowcJ, in keeping with traJition, l,1 select the theme of this Address. TI'.,:
ln;.titutc·s Annual Dinner has always providcJ the Governor a unique opportunity
uf presenting an aJJress on a topical anJ kaJing issul'. of interest to the financi:ii
scrvic1:s inJustry. I am sure that this year will not be :m exception. Given th..unst:1hh: macroeconomic environment which has prevaileJ in Nigeria in thc last
kw years and the great interest anJ orncern this has gcncrateJ among professionals
:1nJ till'. general puhlic, I consiJer it appropriate to fo..:us my presentation on The
Role of the Central Bank in the :,.;igc.-ian Ernnom_y. with a view hl highlighting
the Bank's rcspunsibilitics anJ its C,)ntrihutions within the hroaJ context o[
macroeconomic management in the country. ln this connection. I welcome this
opportunity lo put matters in Lhl'.ir pwpn perspectives, having rcgarJ tu the spate of
L"Titicisms levcllcJ against thl'. Central Bank of Nigeria [CBNj for the prolnngcJ
unhealthy state or the Nigerian economy.

I.

,

BACKGROUND
For a start, let me provide some hackgrnunJ tll my AJJrcss. In lhis rcgarJ, 1
\Vish ll) state that the objectives of a central hank arc hroaJly the sarrn:
wurlJ-wiJc anJ may he classiried into \wo catcgtlfics. Firs!. a central bank is
commlrnly vicwc.:J in krms of its traJiti,1nal functions as the issuu or currency,
hanker to the government, controller uf creJit. a lender of bst n:sort anJ
supervisor nf hanks. ScconJ, a central hank can he perceivcJ as a motivator of
the financial sector anJ a promoter of general cco11<imic Jevclupmcnt. It is,
lwwcvcr, incorrect, to view lhcsl'. two hroad goals -- mnnctary stahilizatiun anJ
prnmution of economic Jcvclopmcnt - as mutually exclusiv1: as !hey indecJ
reinforce each other with monetary slahility forming !he hasis nf suslainahlc
grnwlh. In JevelopcJ economics, atlcntion of central hanks is focusl'.d un shnrt
lnm macroeconomic stahilization, hut it is now the '1L1guc, L·wn in thl'.sl·
ccu11,1111ics, for such acti,,n~ In he used to influence hasic n:1tiunal Jcvclopmenl
nhjcctives. UnJerstanJahly, a central bank in a Jevcloping cc·.momy is usually
manJa\cJ hi pursue the two hrn:1J goals. and more often than not, is pl'rceiveJ,

Hcing lhc full text of an J\JJrcss a1 1he Annual Dinner of 1hc Chancrcd Institute of [lankcrs of Nigeria
(CIBN) held at L"llo1el f:ko Mcridil'II, Victoria lsbnd. l l1h Novenihcr. 199-1.
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tho~gh erronenu:-.ly. hy the general public a:-. the prime 111<1\ er ,1! thL' ct·,1n,m1y.
In \\hatncr :-.ctting the central hank operates. 1L, adu,il pcrf,1rmant·c 1:-,
dctcr1111ncd L1rgcly hy 1h cn:1hl111g legal tr.1111ewmk. the 111:-.l1lut1,H1.il :-.tructurc
1d
lhL· 1111:mnal scct()r which 1s ih primary l·,111:-.tilUL'nc~. and !ht'
m:1u"L'c, 111, 1m 1c envin 1n111cnt. I wish to apply these hrnad :-.t.1te111cnts t,1 the
N1gn1<1 01111l'xt in the next part of my Addre:-.s.

II. DETER\IINANTS OF THE ROLE OF THE CBN IN A DYNA!\1IC
E'I;\' I RO~l\1 E:\'T
-'

Sinn· 11:- L''-L1hli:-.hmcnt 111 1958, the (1)1jcd1\TS ol the CBN, as outlined in the
cn:1hling I 1\\'". ha\·c remained hrnadly the same, but the arrangemenl<; and
~tratq.11cs I, 1r <1d11ev111g the ()hJlXt1ve,- have changed in :-.cope and character. In
ge11L·1,1I. the mcthllds tll :1L·hin 111g ih uhju·tives have widened in consonance
,,·1th thL· Lh 11:11111c:-. ll! tlw 1cgal, mstitut1onal and macro-economic
en\ 1r,1nme11h

-+.

Leg1slat1\ L' ch:111:.:.,·-.. h:1\'L' 1·., mluced a tremendous impact on the operations of
the B.1nk ThL' m.11n s,1urces, a:-. you are all aware, of the CBN's legal authority
:ire the CB~ DLnee Nn. 2-+ of l 991 and the Banks and Other Financial
ln"11lul1lln" DecH·,· [BOFID] No. 25 nr J9'Jl which n;placed the CBN Act of
J<J5,,: aml t11" B,,:1~irig DL'lll'l' llt' Jli(1lJ [.md their various amendrnenl,]. While
the earlier kgi:-.lat1ons tended tll erode the authority of the CBN with regard to
the ext·cut1, 111 \lf it.-.. prim:1r~ m:111d:1te. the l 9L)l legislations attempted to reverse
that trrnd and :-.upport the widened scope of the Bank's activities. The
legislations rationalisnl the :-.e1ies ,11 l'inancial sector reforms initiated since
JLJr;ri and enh:111enl the Bank·-.. pn\\'n ,it surveillance over the financial seclor.
Anuther notable chan[lc 111 the legal lramewmk was the Bank's direct access to
the Presidency instead ,ii thrllugh the ;\1ini:-.tcr nf Finance, \Vhich has enhanced
c()n:-.idcrat1un ,if ih ,JU\'1cc h\ the highest authnrity of governmrnt.

.:;

ThL' i.:lkcl ()l thL· r:1p1d µ1c)\\th ,1l thL' l111;111c1al seclur nn the Bank's operations
has a Is,, been perv:1 -..1\·c. ThL' N igcrian fmancial sector has expanded
tre111~ndously since 1°1_",:, c111d the B:111k has had to modlly the nature and style
ut' 1h surveill.ince. Fur instance, let me cite the example of the rapid growth of
commercial :111J mcrch:111t \ .inks - the primary mstitutions nf the sector. In
1960, there were unly 13 ul these banks with 190 branches. In 1985, the
number ut the hanks had 111crL·a,ed tu --io while their branch network expanded
tu 1,323. By J 9<J3, these were 120 hanks with a branch network of 2,479. Apart
frum n,:·,1merc1al and rnerdiant hanks, the number of other financial
111st1lution:-. ha:-. mcreased, \\'h1le some of them, such as the People's Bank of
Nigeria, community hanks, primary mortgage finance institutions and finance
cumpaniL·:-. have emerged and expcrirnced even more rapid growth than the
c,H1ventiunal mstitutions. In respon:-.e, the. CBN has grown in size and structure
and modi I1ed its :1pprnad1 tu I111:111ual sector regulation and surveillance.
0

(1.

Bv far the greatL·st influence on Bank's operations has been produced by the

structural changes in the economy. The Nigerian economy has expanded
s1gnit'1cantly especially since 1970. The nature and scope of economic
management have varied widely. In the early 1960s, economic management
was relatively less dependent on control mechanisms. However, between the
start or the civil war and 19~5, government involvement in the economy
increased substantially and this was accompanied hy the increased use of
control instruments. The control instruments introduced serious distortions
uvcr time 11110 the ccunomy hut were popular and susL1incd hy the availability
ol substantial foreign cx-:hangc resources. As these resources diminished
rapidly, especially in the early 198lls, the control instruments became
111crcas111gly countcr-pwducti\'c. By 19S(), they became unsustainable and \Vere
large!:, dismantled as part uf the cumprchcnsin: macrnccnnomIC policy reform
prngrammc pupula1 ly cillcd SJ\P.
7

Signilicant gains wne made during the rclurm, but sume disturti,1ns remained
largely hecau-.;c nl the m:gal1\ c impaL·t ul unduly cxpansi,rnary gu\'crnmcnt
l!scal llpcrati,)ns. Aga111 111 1YlJ-+, ccunum1c management has, alter a lairly long
period ul dcregulatt()n, shirted tu the use uf control instruments.

,-.;

The mas\1\'e changes in macrnccunom1c management characterised hy
lrc4ucnt pulicy re\'crsals. have pruduL·ed a significant 111llucnce on CR'.'J
response and operations. The B;1nk built up a large bureaucracy tn support the
control mechanisms from the mid-1960s and became literally uvcrwhclmcd in
managing the huge mcrease in the number of accounb and the limited foreign
exchange rcsuurccs, as well as the rapid grn\vth in domestic liquidity and the
external debt stock. On the whulc, it rL·spundcd ade4uately to the ccnnum1c
reform programme lrom 1986, especially in the areas of foreign exchange and
dcht management and monetary control. Just as it was getting used to
managing an emerging market-based financial sectur and had 111dccd largely
dismantled the control apparatus, 1t has become involved once murc in 199..i in
the execution or the new control-based ec()Jwmic management regime.

Ill.APPRAISAL OF CBN'S PERFORI\IANCE
'l

Given the dynamic changes in the Nigerian economy outlined earlier, I wish
now in this part of my Address to ut1dertake an appraisal of CBN's
performance under those circumstances. In this connection, I shall sketch its
activities in historical perspective, assess the impact on the macrocconomy and
identify the achievements and constraints.

Role of the CBN in Historical Perspective
W. The CBN has always been deeply committed to the execution of its traditional
functions aimed primarily at stabilizing the economy. The period up to 1981
could be described as the golden period. The Bank introduced the first national
currency in 1959 and made several changes in its design, including those in
1965, 1968, 1973, 1977 and 1979. In managing the external reserves, the Bank
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during this period successfully maintained an adequate level of reserves which
preserved the international value <'f the nat1unal cum:ncy. With adequate
external reserves. the administrativ1: determination of the exchange rate
appeared appropriate. Monetary control was largcl) dkctive although the
control instruments made this exercise in~-reasingly mnrc difficult. The growth
of the financial sector ,vas nwdest \\ h1ch made the Bank"s surveillance
relatively effective. In its capacity as hanker and adviser to the government, the
Bank kept government fmances prolessilmally and initiall'd a framework for
domestic deht management. It also ullnld u..,cful advice through its monetary
policy proposals, the annual hudgcts ,md its memhcrship of national
committees.
11. In the area of promoting financi.il iristitutiun:, and markets during the period up
to 1981, the Bank"s rnlc \\'as s1griit1cant 111 shaping the course of economic
growth and development. In tlll' money market, for instance, the Bank
introduced several instruments : 1cs1gncd lo raise government revenue and
mohiltze s'.,mt-tcrm li11a1h:i;tl rc,ource-. tor development. In the capital market,
the Rink activclv suppu1lcJ the establishment of the Nigerian Stock Exchange
and the N1gcnan Securities and Exchange Com1111ss1on. Furthermore, the Bank
rn-spom,ored the establishment of specialised financial institutions providing
!,mg-term l111.mce tnr industnal. L·11n1111ercial and agricultural activities. Notable
ex:1mplcs ,1rc the !\IDB, NBC!, NACB, FMBN and the ACGS Fund.
12. You will all agree with me that economic developments in Nigeria since 1981
have been s1gn1r1cant. We have witnessed the rapid downturn in the early
1980s, thl' hold d forts lo reverse the trends through the economic reform
prngramnw, th1: seem111g lailure of the reform programme to arrest the trends
and the apparent return lo the use uf enmnmic controls. It is not my intention
lo hml' y(\u \\ 1th the dctatls or the Bank·s activities during this period, hut to
1r1d1catc 111 outline its role m the dfort Lo arrest economic dt)wnlurn. Before the
launch111g ol the reform prngr:1111mc 111 1986, the Bank was particularly active
111 gL'ltrng g11\ nnment to mudily its style of economic management when it
'Sa, ,:ka, that the cxistmg strategy had failed. After the programme was
:1c111pteJ 111 1'!Sb, the Rmk pLi::, cd a critical supporting role, especially in
managmg the new Foreign Exchange Market; designing the programme of
rc!orm for the market-oriented financial sector; introducing a new system of
market-based monetary management with Open Market Operations [OMO] as
the main instrument of control; stemming the growth of domestic liquidity at
critical periods, active support in the management of the bulging external debt;
managing the domestic debt ,if the Federal Government and coping with the
increasing level or financial distress and erosion of confidence i-n the financial
sector.

13. Indeed, the role of the Bank during this period in the execution of its traditional
functions was so active that it was generally misconstrued that the Structural
Adjustment Prnf,amme was the "h:1hy" of the Bank. Consequently, all the
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problems observed with the implementation of the programme were !,lamed on
the Bank even when there were indications that the fundamental factors could
not be directly traced to the failings of the Bank's traditional functions.

14. I do not wish to give the impression that the CBN has been concerned with
only its traditional functions since 1991. Indeed, it continued to support the
growth of the financial sector and to promote economic development generally.
During the reform programme, for instance, the Bank actively participated in
promoting a number of innovative financial institutions and financing schemes,
notably the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation [NDICJ, the Nigerian
Export Import Bank (NEXIM), the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises
Scheme (SME), the Natiunal Economic Reconstructiun Fund (!\ERFUND), the
Refinancing and Rediscounting Facility and the Export Stimulati,1n Loan
(ESL). In 1991, the Bank successfully completed the Rural Bankrng
Progrnmme under whid1. 111 three phases, a tut.ti of 765 rural h;111k branche.-., uut
of the 766 allucated lo hanks were opened thruughout the country. The Bank,
through these institutions and funds, sought tu increase the :surveillance O\'l'f
the financial sector, enhance savings mobilization, prumolL' producliun tm
export and encourage the growth of small scale enterprises. In addition, the
Bank continued to give active support to the development finance institutions,
as well as the re-orienlatiun of the money and capital m:1rkcls in order to
enhance allocative efficiency.

Impact of CBN's Activities on the Economy
15. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, turning now to the impact of CBN"s
policies and activities on the economy, I wish to concede that it is the
achievement of the ultimate targcL" of economic policy that is the most relevant
criterion. In this regard, we are all aware that the ultimate goals of
macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth have so far remained elusive.
The in(btion rate has been high and unstablc, the balance of payments has been
more in deficit than in surplus, while economic growth, after some recovery
between 1988 and 1991, has slackened in the face of persistent macroeconomic
instability and low capital formation. However, I want to caution that the exact
impact of CBN's policies on the ultimate targets of economic policy is
generally difficult to establish owing to the fact that monetary and hanking
policy measures are usually employed in combination with other policies,
including fiscal, trade, exchange rate and incomes policies. In addition, there
are also the effects of purely exogenous factors. For these reasons, I wish to
focus attention on the impact of CBN's actions on the intermediate target
variable - monetary aggregates, interest and exchange rates.

16. The highly unstahle macroeconomic environment in recent years has been
characterised by the excessive growth in monetary aggregates as the growth of
narrow money, Ml, remained substantially way off target especially since
1988. In fact, the worst years in terms of policy slippages were 1988, 1990,
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1992 and 1993 when the divergences between the targeted M 1 growth rate and
actual performance were 26.9, ~ 1 9, 32.8 and 34.6 pen.:cntagc points,
respectively. The ability of the CBN in regulating the money supply over the
years has been dictated to a large extent by the magnitude of Government's
fiscal deficit and the mode of financing it. The excessive growth in private
sector credit, and foreign assets monetization have, to a lesser degree, also
exerted some expansionary influence. Money supply growth was moderate in
those years when net claims on the Government rose only moderately or
declined as happened in 1986, 1987 and 1989, while the rapid increases in
1988, 1991, 1992 and 1993 were associared with relatively large increases in
credit ( net) to the sector.
17. It should be emphasized that the bulk of credit to Government has come from
the CBN and was therefore highly inl1ationary. The accelen:tion in money
supply growth in 1990, on the other hand, reflected substantially the
monetization of oil receipts. Although bank credit to the private sector was
always a significant cxpansioaary factor, large enough in every year except
1989 to dri\'c money supply beyond the Ml target, the dominance of
Government was overwhelming. In 1994, however, available data indicate that
commercial and merchant banks· credit to the private sector exhibited
unprecedented growth, having risen hy 76.9 and 79.1 per cent, respectively, in
the first six months. compared with the powth rates of 22.6 and 17 per cent in
the corresponding period a year earlier, owing largely to increased foreign
exchange demand by private economic agents under the existing foreign
exchange and interest rate policies.
18. Market interest rates rose steeply in the environment of high and unstable
inflation rates and as a result of actions taken by the Monetary Authorities to
counter large injections of liquidity arising from the financing of government
deficit. Despite the sharp rise in nominal rates, real rates of interest remained
negative in 1988 and 1989 and frnm 1992, owing to rising inflation with
adverse implications for saving mobilization and domestic investment. The
government thus intervened again in 1994, pegging deposit and maximum
lending rates of all financial institutions at 12-15 and 21 per cent, respectively,
in order to halt the adverse trends as well as evolve a more appropriate interest
rate regime.
19. With respect to the exchange rate, the Nairn has depreciated almost persistently
since SAP. Except in 1986 and 1987 when the large depreciation resulted from
the previous over valuation of the currency, movements in the exchange rate
have been influenced by the high level of aggregate demand relative to supply,
and speculation.
20. With the increasing incidence of financial sector distress, the
regulatory/supervisory capacity of the Central Bank has increasingly been
called to question. There are those who assert that the regulatory authorities
had not done enough to protect depositors and other creditors from the menace
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of imprudent and frauduknt operators and bnng them to hook. While I
acknowledge that more needs to be done by the regulatory/supervisory
authorities to ensure the safety, soundness and efficiency of the financial
services industry, that task cannot he undertaken hy the regulatory/supervisory
authorities alone. The action or lack of it by these agencies should he seen in
the context of macroeconomic and policy instability; economic recession; the
distortions in the system; unsafe and unsound banking_practices by operators;
insider dealing and abuses; the indifference or negligence of directors and
sharehol.ders; the greed of investors; and the failure of sanctions. Consequently,
it is unfair to hold the regulatory/supervisory authorities for what is manifestly
r,1rt of the generalised societal indiscipline in the country. Viewed in th:. light,
rs:'5cuing the financial system requires the collaborative endeavours of
Government ·through the political will; the regulatory authorities throug·
capacity building and robust supervisory intervention; the financial institutions
by adopting more prudent and efficient hanking practices and self- regulation;
the law enforcement agents hy bringing offenders to hook; and the banking
public should be less gullible in reaching to manifestly unrealistic investment
offers.

Overall Assessment of CB N's Role
21. A less than objective appraisal of the CBN's role in the Nigerian economy
could interprete the basis of the above adverse macroeconomic and sectoral
trends as evidence of failure on the part of the CBN. If it is accepted that, as
stated earlier, macroeconomic policies are usually executed hy various
agencies in collaborative effort'-, the failures of such policies should be
correctly traced to the nature of the national economic management system.
Furthermore, I should like to argue that the ultimate effects of many of the
Bank's actions in recent years would have their potential benefits manifest in
the future as the prevailing environment could only have permitted only limited
short-term gains.
22. Yet, these short-term gains are noteworthy. A liberal financial sector which the
CBN has assiduously fashioned out since 1986 is essential for the nation's
growth and development. The supervisory and prudential role effectively
assumed by the Bank will pay off in the medium to long term through inspiring
greater public confidence in financial institutions. The Bank's role in giving
expert advice and the dissemination of research results and wide-ranging
information on the economy is one that the Management of the Bank feels
happy and even proud about. Another contribution worthy of mention has been
the Bank's role in the training of manpower for the financial services industry.
Its Training Centre is about the largest for any Central Bank in Sub-Saharan
Africa. The Bank's support for other training institutions in the financial sector
and other ar~s of the economy such as FITC, CIBN, NCEMA, professional
associations and the Universities is also substantial. This role in capacity
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building is important and should be seen in the context of helping to re:.olve the
critical bottleneck in extending financial intermediation. Recently, the CBN
took the initiative in bringing about the establishment of the Financial Services
Regulation Co-ordinating Committee intended to harmonise and strengthen
supervisory activity.

Constraints on CBN's Performance
23. Obviously, the CBN has made significant contributions to the growth of the
Nigerian economy and as I said earlier, the full impact of its recent actions will
only materialise in the future. This is not to deny that the Bank has serious
constraints in the performance of its functions. These have been wellarticulated in the Bank"s numerous submissions and arc very well known by
concerned professionals like yourselves. However, for completeness and
emphasis, I should like to highlight them here. The first constraint has been the
persistence of large government deficits and their financing by the CBN. This
mode of deficit financing increases the monetary base and swells the level of
excess liquidity in the banking system with adverse implications for the naira
exchange rate and domestic prices. When the CBN inevitably acts to reduce the
excess liquidity through, for instance, the issuance of stabilization securities
since 1990, the money market is destabilised with a lot of pressure put on
interest rates. The second main constraint is the prevalence of policy
inconsistency and instability. In the last few years, monetary policy outcomes
have been largely at variance with targets. Policy reversals in respect of
exchange and interest rates are well known to you. There is a third related
constraint, namely, inadequate co-ordination of policy implementation which
has impacted negatively on the productive sectors.
24. The fourth constraint is the pervasive intervention by government in the
financial sector. Indeed, such intervention has resulted in the proliferation of
regulatory authorities in the sector and this has often sent conflicting signals to
the public since no co-ordinating arrangement was put in place until recently.
The fifth constraint is the relationship between the Bank and the Federal
Government. The current legal framework which defines that relationship is
certainly an improvement on the earlier one, but certain provisions constrain
the Bank from taklng immediate actions on issues that require such prompt
response since the prior approval of government must be obtained. Also, a
situation of increased lack of transparency by market participants and where
the spirit of the law is not observed constrains the powers of the Bank to act
decisively. Lastly, there are constraints related to inadequate statistics and
infrastructure, a problem complicated by the fact that the Bank alone cannot
take the remedial actions.

IV LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE
25. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I am inclined to believe that the CBN has
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made immense contributions to the growth and development of the Nigerian
economy in the last three and a half decades. It could have attained greater
achievements if the constraints highlighted above had been adequately
addressed. Some of the immediate steps to be taken to enhance the
effectiveness of the Bank include:
(i) appropriate amendments to the enabling laws with a view to strengthening
the Bank's powers in executing some monetary and banking policy
measures independently;
(ii) strengthening the implementation of monetary policy through fiscal
restraint, greater policy coordination, policy consistency and stability and
enhancement of technological infrastructure in the financial sector; and
(iii)review of the Bank's organisational structure and functir;ns to mak, ;t
slimmer and fitter and more focused in its policy concerns with greah
beneficial impact on the economy.
26. Most of the constraints outlined earlier can be minimised while the remedial
actions suggested can be speedily resolved if a leading issue of international
relevance is speedily addressed. This is the issue of autonomy for the Central
Bank. As I indicated earlier, the existing laws are an improvement on earlier
ones, but in a sense, they have merely changed the status of the Bank rather
than enhanced its authority to carry out its stated functions. As you arc aware,
this issue is receiving the attention of government, but I should like to highlight
the principles that should define Federal Government-CBN relationship in the
future. The need to accord central banks some form of autonomy capable of
enhancing their authority is widely recognised. The available literature cites
Germany, Switzerland, U.S.A. and New Zealand as having achieved sustained
price stability and economic growth owing to the relatively high degree of
autonomy given to the Central Banks in those countries. In this setting, the
central bank is seen as acting as an indepeadent and objective adviser to the
government to maintain ~oeconomic stability. The law that gives such
autonomy to the central bank should be clear and unambiguous as to the need
for the central bank to perform its core functions uninhibited, thus making ii
unnecessary to refer urgent and 1mpir,rtant matters for determination by the
government. Of course, it is important that the practice must accord with th._
legal provisions.
27. If the above pre-conditions prevail, I would recommend gi,:ing the so-calico
instrument indepenM,w:, to the CBN. Thi~ implies that after the governmen!
has set the broad objectives of economic policy, the CBN should be given th ..
discretion to choose the appropriate instruments and when to apply them b
achieve the desired objectives. Such instruments which the CBN should be
allowed to manipulate appropriately include the monetary aggregates, as well
as exchange and interest rates. It is, of course, important that the Bank must be
allowed to continue to run its internal administration. However, I wish to
emphasise that the autonomy sketched above does not amount to creating a
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parallel agency to the government. The Federal Government owns the Bank
and this immediately defines its ultimate relationship with the government.
Periodic briefings to the Head of State and top government officials should
continue as at present. Other observers have advocated, and I tend to agree
with them, that the appointment of the Governor of the Bank should be
sanctioned by the legislature. I will also add that the Governor of the Bank
should be given the opportunity to report on the Bank's activities to the
legislative body which has the advantage of subjecting the authority of the
Bank to the wishes of the general public through their representatives, thereby
making the Central Bank accountable to the people.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
28. Mr. President, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, in conclusion, I wish to
assert that although the challenges which lie ahead of the CBN are enormous, if
not daunting, the Bank will respond adequately if given the support to carry out
its functions. Its contributions to the economy will be enhanced and its role in
creating a robust financial sector will increase. Lifting my gaze and making
some prognosis regarding the character of the CBN by the year 2000, I see a
smaller outfit both structurally and functionally. Shed of some of its
developmental activities which can effectively be taken over by other agencies,
it should focus on its stabilization functions which can sustain price stability
and restore full confidence to the financial sector. If given the autonomy that I
have discussed earlier, it should become a more effective institution, less
susceptible to political influence and gaining greater confidence of the general
public.

Mr. President, Distinguished Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, in concluding
this Address on a note of optimism, I want to remind all of us that it is our
actions that create the institutions we have. It is a challenge to all of us - the
government, the CBN, financial operators and the general public - to create a
Central Bank within a suitable environment that is sufficiently responsible to
the needs of the economy.
I thank you all for your kind attention.

